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Abstract
The thought of Miguel De Unamuno (1864-1936), a twentieth
century Spanish philosopher, belongs to the genre of existentialism in the
history of Western philosophy. The term ‘existentialism’ has diverse but
reconcilable definitions or interpretations such that it can be broadly ac-
cepted to mean the philosophy of human existence. It is concerned with
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the interpretation and description of existential issues and problems of
human existence that are concrete.  Unamuno’s views on the contingent
nature of man and his existence __ earthly experiences __ are mainly con-
tained in The Tragic sense of Life. In the book, Unamuno construes man
as a composite of two oscillating extremes or opposites of faith and doubt.
An account of Unamuno’s thought shows that “just as man is a concrete
matter-and-spirit, heart-and-intellect unit, so is he an indivisible unit of
faith and doubt”. This paper is a critical engagement with Unamuno’s thought
with a view to showing how its grapples with the notion of (human) trag-
edy.
UNAMUNO’S EXISTENTIALISM IN GENERAL
The characterization of philosophic existentialism as that which
addresses itself substantially to the “personal” or “concrete” rather than
the “impersonal” or “abstract” is true of Unamuno’s philosophy to the
extent that his primary philosophical interest is the value of the individual
person. By this, we mean that Unamuno’s philosophical object and sub-
ject of inquiry is the man of “flesh and bone”4 and not the abstract man of
Plato, for example. This is how Unamuno describes the object and sub-
ject of his philosophical concern:
The man of flesh and blood; the one who is born,
suffers and above all, who dies; the man who eats and
drinks and plays and sleeps and thinks and wills; the man
who is seen and is heard; the brother, the real brother.5
This view accounts for why Ferrater Mora argues that Unamuno
is not concerned with abstractions but people of flesh and blood, complex
and concrete people.6 It is for a reason such as this that Unamuno denies
the appellation of “a philosopher”, given the traditional belief that philoso-
phers are generally people who are obsessed with abstractions. It is for
the reason of excessive indulgence in abstract rationalization that Unamuno
seeks to dismiss classical philosophies, especially on the strength of hav-
ing paid little attention to human attitudes that are invariably concrete.
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According to Unamuno, the human person is the subject and su-
preme object of all philosophy.  The reason is that man is the end of all
things. In other words, “man is an end, not a means. All civilization ad-
dresses itself to man, to each man to each I”.7 As a matter of fact,
Unamuno’s existentialist philosophy is literally a philosophical inquiry into
what constitutes a human person in terms of both his inward attitude and
outward action. According to Unamuno,
In most of the histories of philosophy that I know, philo-
sophic systems are presented to us as if growing out of
one another spontaneously, and their authors, the philoso-
phers, appear only as mere pretexts. The biography of
the philosophers of the men who philosophized occupies
a secondary place. And yet it is precisely this inner biog-
raphy that explains for us most things.8
By this view, Unamuno introduces a radical dimension to existen-
tial philosophizing to the extent that he does not only concern himself with
concrete human situations and existence (which are the traditional do-
mains of existentialist philosophers) but what lies within man. The inner
composition of man which Unamuno is so much interested in shall be
made clear as we progress in the exposition of his philosophy. At this
point, it becomes important to note that a significant philosophical tradi-
tion which Unamuno’s thought is often contrasted with is rationalism, the
philosophical doctrine which views the cognitive power of human person
as the most significant aid to him. In a rationalist tradition, “reason” is held
supreme as the best attribute of man. This is, for example, exemplified in
the philosophy of Aristotle which construes man to be a rational animal.
To be sure, the thesis which all rationalist philosophers seek to
defend is that “man is a natural creation in a natural world of cause and
effect: and that with the aid of reason we can master nature, manipulate
society, change culture and indeed shape ourselves.9
Unamuno’s thought is not only a substantial negation and rebuttal
of rationalism but also an affirmation of emotional virtues of man. He ar-
gues that,
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man is said to be a reasoning animal. I do not know why
he has not been defined as an affective or feeling animal.
Perhaps, that which differentiates him from other animals
is feeling rather than reason. More often, I have seen a
cat reason then laugh or weep.10
Unamuno thus views emotion rather than reason as a distinguish-
ing feature between man and other animals.  He says the merely and ex-
clusively rational man, is an aberration and nothing but an aberration.11
Closely related to this is Unamuno’s idea that philosophizing is not wholly
a rational exercise, given the argument that the will or heart is more active
in every philosophic exercise.
According to him,
Philosophy is a product of the humanity of each philoso-
pher, and each philosopher is a man of flesh and bone
who addresses himself to other man of flesh and bone
like himself. And let him do what he will, he philosophizes
not with reason only but with the will, with the feelings,
with the flesh and with the bones with the whole bone and
whole body. It is the man that philosophizes.12
Unamuno further argues,
Philosophical answers to our need of forming a complete
world and of life, and as a result of this conception, a
feeling which gives birth to an inward attitude and even to
outward action. But the fact is that this feeling, instead of
being a consequence of this conception is the cause of it.
Our philosophy __ that is our mode of understanding the
world and life __ sprang from our feeling towards life itself.
And life like every thing affective has roofs in
subconsiousness perhaps in unconsciousness.13
Unamuno thus believes that the depths, range and complexities of
human existence are such that reason by itself is insufficient to grapple
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with them. Or in the words of Bernard E. Melcard, “We live more deeply
than we can think”.14
These views capture embodied ideas or facts about irrationalism,
the existentialist temper which “draws our attention, in a dramatic way, to
the fact that human reason is limited”.15 In this context, Hegel’s philosophy
which makes reason an “utmost stuff of all things” and other related phi-
losophies are regarded as a foil to be destroyed in Unamuno’s philoso-
phy. According to Unamuno, the doctrine of rationalism which abides
solely by reason or objective truth is necessarily materialist. He thus views
rationalism and materialism as one and the same, since they both mean
nothing else than the doctrine which “denies the immortality of the indi-
vidual soul, the persistence of personal consciousness after death”.16 For
example, Unamuno argues that while Hegel made famous his aphorism
that all the rational is real and the real rational, there are many of us who,
unconvinced by Hegel, continue to believe the real, the really real is irra-
tional, that reason builds upon irrationalities17 Arthur Schopenhauer shares
a similar irrationalist viewpoint.18 Like Unamuno, he argues that the “real”
or “ultimate reality” is the irrational. Upon this philosophical mindset, it is
inevitable for Unamuno to hold a low opinion for knowledge that does not
promote emotional feelings and desires of man.
In fact, an account of Unamuno’s epistemology shows that he
discriminated among a hierarchy of knowledge in favour of spiritual knowl-
edge. By spiritual knowledge, he means knowledge at the service of emo-
tion, passion, faith and that which helps to nurture the belief in immortality.
As Unamuno poignantly puts it,
All knowledge has an ultimate object. Knowledge for the
sake of knowledge is, say what you will, nothing but a
dismal begging of the question. We learn something either
for an immediate practical end or in order to complete the
rest of our knowledge. Even the knowledge that appears
to us to be most theoretical __ that is  to say of least imme-
diate application to the non-intellectual necessities of life
__ answers to a necessity which is less real because it is
intellectual to a reason of economy in thinking, to a prin-
ciple of unity and  continuity of  consciousness. But just as
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a scientific fact has its finality in the rest of knowledge, so
the philosophy that we would make our own has also its
extrinsic object it refers to our whole destiny, to our atti-
tude in face of life and the universe.19
By this rendering, Unamuno is particularly critical of science and
knowledge based on reason. He explores a series of argument to protest
the usefulness of scientific knowledge. For example, he argues that “sci-
ence exists only in personal consciousness just as astronomy, mathemat-
ics have no other reality than that which they possess as knowledge in the
minds of those who study and cultivate them”.20 Explicit in Unamuno’s
rejection of science is the explanation that it cannot satisfy man’s highest
or deepest desire for immortality. This is how Unamuno puts it,
I do not know why some people were scandalized, or
pretended to be scandalized, when Brunetieòre proclaimed
again the bankruptcy of science. For science as a substi-
tute for relation and reason as substitute for faith have
always fallen to pieces. Science will be able to satisfy and
in fact does satisfy, in an increasing measure, our logical
or intellectual needs, our desire to know and understand
the truth; but science does not satisfy the needs of our
heart and our will, and far from satisfying our hunger for
immortality, it contradicts it.21
The reason Unamuno gives for the inability of science to meet the
supreme desire of man is well brought out when he says,
any knowledge that cannot or does not prove that the
soul is immortal or that the human consciousness shall
preserve its indestructibility through the tracts of time to
come or cannot or does not prove that individual con-
sciousness can persist after the death of the physical or-
ganism upon which it depends should be committed to
flames to use the words of Hume.22
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Unamuno’s denigration of science and other related knowledge
claims is thus predicated generally on the strength of the argument that
they only promote human understanding of reality. Yet, to Unamuno, “the
end of life is living and not understanding”.23 C. Robert and K.M Higgins
argue that Unamuno bemoaned the failure of objective science and rea-
son to answer life’s questions and defended a version of subjective truth.24
Having explored the poverty of science for not being able to solve
the ultimate questions of life, Unamuno is faced with the question about
what life’s questions are. According to Unamuno, life’s questions are is-
sues about man’s ultimate end __ immortality. He argues that science or
reason teaches that immortality is highly problematic and absurd. Or to be
more exact, “reason teaches us nothing in this connection and thus leaves
us in a state of perplexity”.25
A further scrutiny of Unamuno’s rejection of objective science
and reason shows that his epistemology is anchored on a foremost theme
of his philosophy, namely, “the longing not to die, the hunger for personal
immortality”.26 Jose Mora views the theme of immortality as the most
insistent in Unamuno’s thought. The desire for immortality is such a central
phenomenon in Unamuno’s thought that Mora argues that,
Faced with the question, what is the most important prob-
lem for man? Unamuno would have declared in all likeli-
hood that it was the question of the soul’s ultimate des-
tiny, that is, whether or not the soul is immortal.27
As we have seen, this view is perfectly or wholly true of Unamuno’s
philosophy of human existence, given that there is no desire that is as
fundamental to man as that of self-preservation and self-perpetuation.
Unamuno is definite in asserting this supreme desire when he says,
Eternity, eternity! __ this is the supreme desire! The thirst
of eternity is what is called among men, and whosoever
loves another wishes to eternalize himself in him. Nothing
is real that is not eternal.28
In Unamuno’s thought the term “eternity” is often interchanged
78 Prajna Vihara~
_ _
with immortality since both depict or satisfy man’s instinct of self-perpetu-
ation, that is, “to be forever, to be without ending”.29  Unamuno’s ethics is
man-centered to the extent that “goodness” is measured according to the
extent to which it guarantees the preservation and perpetuation of man on
earth. Given this, Unamuno argues that,
… What end is goodness? Is it perhaps an end in itself?
Good is simply that which contributes to the preserva-
tion, perpetuation and enrichment of consciousness. Good-
ness addresses itself to man, to the maintenance and per-
fection of human society which is composed of men. And
to what end is this? “So act that your action may be pat-
tern to all men” Kant tells us.30
It is clear from the formulation of his ethics that Unamuno is em-
phatic that for the actions of men in human society to be adjudged as good
and moral, they must be tailored towards the realization of human perpe-
tuity or immortality. However our brief mention of Unamuno’s ethics here
is to justify a fundamental conclusion. It is that the theme of immortality is
the single thread that ties together other themes in Unamuno’s philosophy.
Unamuno’s use of immortality in this context is ambiguous. It is
not so clear whether by the term he means a spiritual phenomenon only. In
its most straight forward form, the term “immortality” refers to a belief
which expresses that the soul survives the biological death of the body.
This form of immortality is expressed by most, if not all religions or reli-
gious people like the Christians, Moslems and Hinduists. C. Agulanna
argues that the belief in immortality is not only held by religious people
alone, given that philosophers such as Plato, Descartes, Kant as well as
most human cultures including African culture,31 have all held views that
can be readily used  to justify belief in the immortality of the soul. How-
ever, what is common in the various notions of immortality and which is
the defining idea of immortality, is the treatment of the soul as a separate
entity different from the (physical) concrete man.
From his numerous examples, it is clear that Unamuno adopts a
position regarding the idea of immortality that is quite different from the
one which is found, for example, in the tradition of Judea-Christian mono-
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theism. For example, Unamuno argues that,
When doubts invade us and cloud our faith in the immor-
tality of the soul, a vigorous and painful impulse is given to
the anxiety to perpetuate our name and fame, to grasp at
least a shadow of immortality. And hence this tremendous
struggle to singularize ourselves, to survive in some way
in the memory of others and posterity. It is this struggle, a
thousand times more terrible, than the struggle for life that
gives its tone, colour and character to our society, in which
the medieval faith in the immortal soul is passing way. Each
one seeks to affirm himself, if only in appearance.32
J. Mora succinctly captures such a distinction in the analysis of
Unamuno’s idea of immortality in the following words,
Although … he often used the vocabulary of the Platonic
__ Christian tradition, his purpose was not the same. In
fact, it is misleading to speak of Unamuno’s idea of the
soul in any terms that suggest an entity separate or sepa-
rable from the body. Even though we shall be obliged to
use this same terminology, as Unamuno was - the “soul”
“immortality” and immortality of the soul __ it must be re-
membered that the real problem that concerned Unamuno
was that of the individual human death.33
Implied in Unamuno’s notion of immortality, therefore, is the fact
that it is not exclusively a metaphysical phenomenon. To be sure, Unamuno
agrees that the term “immortality” embodies more than the immaterial to
include all other concrete material things that man does on earth to keep
his name or memory in perpetuity, since to keep one’s name in perpetual
remembrance is not to die. Consequently, Unamuno tied his notion of
immortality to all worldly endeavours because as he argues, every worldly
endeavour is shaped by man’s desire to perpetuate himself. Unamuno
insists that,
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If a man who tells you that he writes, paints, sculptures or
sings for his own amusement, gives his work to the pub-
lic, he lies; he lies if he puts his name to his writing, paint-
ing, status or song. He wishes, at the least, to leave be-
hind a shadow of his spirit, some __ thing that may survive
him.34
This, again, shows concretely that immortality, as a concept is
used by Unamuno to describe not only a metaphysical phenomenon but
such concrete actions of man which are aimed to perpetuate himself, his
memory, his name even after death. It is the same thing as saying that for
life to be meaningful, we need to have a sense that we are contributing to
something beyond ourselves.  Or as Amalia Elguera puts it, if logically
pressed, Unamuno’s desire for immortality can be considered as a desire
to be in history forever.35
This position of Unamuno, however, raises the question as to
whether man can really live forever by a landmark of material achieve-
ments. Our scepticism derives from the fact of history that a time will be or
come when the so-called (material) achievements will disappear into
oblivion. Leslie Muray has rightly argued in this vein when he said that
“contributing to posterity, to future generations, to the on-goingness of
history and so on are, however, all insufficient and inadequate; they are all
transient, subject to perpetual perishing”.36 Unamuno is, perhaps, aware
of this, hence he avers that there is no guarantee that man will realize his
basic desire for personal survival after death. Such scepticism can be
found in Unamuno’s argument that it may be that “it is extinction that awaits
us at death, that this fundamental human desire will be frustrated”.37 By
this scepticism, Unamuno introduces a veil of uncertainty about man’s
ultimate destiny. It is such a theatre of uncertainty that defines the tragic
nature of man and his existence.
UNAMUNO  AND  THE  TRAGIC  NATURE  OF  HUMAN
EXISTENCE
At the heart of Unamuno’s philosophical thought is the idea that
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human existence typifies tragedy. It is his characterization of human exist-
ence as tragic that earned Unamuno the appellation “the philosopher of
tragedy”.38 The germane question that follows from the above is: What
does it mean to exist tragically since tragedy has assumed a signification
for human existence?  The dominant notion of tragedy is one which has
defining features of grief, horror and sadness. It is for this reason that
some scholars like Nietzsche and Aristotle have employed the word “tragic”
or “tragedy” to depict an extreme human grief, horror, suffering and so on.
But, again, as we earlier showed, Unamuno is one philosopher who used
the word “tragic” or “tragedy” from a different perspective. Far from iden-
tifying the word with its popular connotation, Unamuno uses the word to
describe a number of human attributes and experiences that are invariably
concrete, for example, the instinct of self-preservation, that of self-per-
petuation, the experience of ambiguity, the inextricate mixture of despera-
tion and hope and so on.39
From this clarification, it becomes clear that our initial question, as
to what it means to exist tragically, can best be explained within the pur-
view of Unamuno’s ontological account of man as an indivisible unit of
“faith” and “hope”, “reason” and “feeling”.  Unamuno implies that the
human person is not wholly rational; neither is he purely an irrational be-
ing. He is at the same time rational and irrational. In any case, it is the
warring coexistence of “reason” and “feeling”, according to Unamuno,
that defines his true contingent nature. Unamuno argues,
Neither the one nor the other of these positions satisfied
us. The one is at variance with our reason, the other with
our feeling. These powers can never conclude peace and
we must needs live by their war. We must make this war,
of war itself, the very condition of our spiritual life.40
From the above clarification of what the nature of man entails, it would
appear that a genuine human existence is a composite of ceaseless war-
ring coexistence of opposites, for instance, of “reason” and “faith”. This is
the case because in this struggle, neither reason nor faith is less important,
given that “the struggle between opposites and each opposite with itself is
not the result of logical contradiction but the very core of the tragic dyna-
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mism of life”.41 In this context, it is axiomatic that though “reason” and
“faith” are construed as “enemies”, none can maintain itself without the
other. By this, Unamuno means, that the irrational demands to be rational-
ized and reason only can operate on the irrational”.42 This suggests that
both reason and faith or the opposites are compelled to seek mutual sup-
port and association.
Thus to say that human existence is tragic, according to Unamuno’s
lexicon, is to hold that existence is “continually torn by the enimity __ which
acts through the coexistence of warring provocations: the will to be and
the suspicion that one can cease to be, feeling and thought, faith and doubt,
certainty and uncertainty, hope and desperation”.43
As highlighted previously, man’s strongest desire, according to
Unamuno, is the hunger for immortality. It is the desire for immortality that
causes each man to “cry out in anguish: I will not die”.44 Indeed, Unamuno
argues that the most profound and shattering of all human experiences is
death, including our awareness and anticipation of it. According to him, if
we do not live forever nothing has value and everything is absurd. But
Unamuno does not accept absurdity or meaninglessness of human exist-
ence in its entirety, given his hope for immortality.
The search for immortality is linked to Unamuno’s understanding
of God. To be sure, Unamuno finds solution to the insolubly linked prob-
lems of immortality and meaning of life in the existence of God without
which man’s existence is absurd, void and meaningless. According to Leslie
Muray, Unamuno finds the solution to the insolubly linked problems of
immortality and meaning of life in an image and concept of God that is
quite suggestive of panentheism.45 For one, Unamuno takes a swipe at the
doctrine of pantheism as typified by Benedict Spinoza’s philosophy be-
cause, according to him, it harbors atheistic tendencies. He argues that:
If the belief in the immortality of the soul has been
unable to find vindication in rational empiricism, neither is
it satisfied with Pantheism. To say that everything is God,
and that when we die we return to God, or more accu-
rately, continue in him, avails our longing nothing; for if
this indeed be so, then we were in God before we were
born, and if when we die we return to where we were
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before being born then the human soul, the individual con-
sciousness is perishable.46
He further says,
And since we know very well that God, the personal and
conscious God of Christian monotheism is simply the pro-
vider and above all the guarantor of our immortality, Pan-
theism is said, and rightly said to be merely atheism dis-
guised: and in my opinion, undisguised.47
This view clearly puts Unamuno on the camp or divide of Chris-
tian monotheism. However, a cursory look at his concept of God reveals,
in a significant way, that Unamuno’s idea of God contrasts with the doc-
trine of Christian monotheism. The reason is that Unamuno desires God
not as Creator,  Judge or Redeemer, but only as Guarantor of immortality.
He thus denies the creative power of God as the Creator of Heaven and
Earth and everything thereof. To be sure, he believes that the   knowledge
of God as Creator cannot aid man to understand the world and human
existence. In his words,
In no way whatever does the idea of God help us to un-
derstand better the existence, the essence and the finality
of the universe.  That theme is a supreme being infinite,
absolute and eternal, whose existence is unknown to us,
and who has created the universe is no more conceivable
than that the material basis of the universe itself, its matter
is eternal and infinite and absolute. We do not understand
the existence of the world … better by telling ourselves
that God created it. It is a begging of the question, or a
merely verbal solution, intended to cover up our igno-
rance. In strict truth, we deduce the existence of the cre-
ator from the fact that the things created exists, a process
which does not justify rationally his existence.48
This is why even though he is classified among Christian existen-
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tialist philosophers; it remains a subject of intense debate whether or not
Unamuno believes in the Christian God. But some scholars like Amalia
Elguera wondered why this should be debated at all since according to
him,
It may surprise the reader of the Tragic Sense that the
question should arise at all for the book states that God is
man’s creation and as such a divinity, even if it were real,
could not possibly be Christian. Moreover, Unamuno
envisages a deity not only anthropomorphic but hermaph-
roditic: the notion of replacement of the trinity by a qua-
ternity through the assumption of the Virgin Mary into the
godhead is put forward both in the commentated life of
Don Quixote and The Tragic Sense.49
A view such as this accounts for why, though classified among
Christian existentialist philosophers, it remains a subject of intense debate
whether or not Unamuno believed in the Christian God. In any case, this
doubt, as we have earlier indicated, issued from Unamuno’s unique con-
ception or idea of God. To participate in that debate as to whether or not
Unamuno believed in the Christian God, is beyond the scope of this work.
Suffice it to say that Unamuno situates his understanding of God and the
meaning of immortality in the experience of death. He believes that it is the
encounter with death that leads us to the quest for immortality and the
search for meaning which “culminates in the sense that our lives matter to
God, that our experiences in their ambiguity are preserved in the divine
memory”50 This is what gives us, according to Unamuno, a sense that our
lives are worthwhile, significant and meaningful in an ultimate and abiding
sense.
Paradoxically, Unamuno argues that there are no absolute guar-
antees and certainties about such a faith, given that the search for immor-
tality is full of its own paradoxes. Put differently, there is a perpetual con-
tradiction in man’s desire for self perpetuation. By this, Unamuno means
that man hovers in a vague mean between “immortality” and “mortality”,
“life” and “death”, “faith” and “doubt”, “being” and “nothingness”. In this
dual attitudinal setup, Unamuno believes that a complete scepticism in
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favour of one out of the two extremes would amount to a denial of the
essential nature of man.  In Unamuno’s words, ‘the tragic history of hu-
man thought is simply the history of a struggle between reason and life __
reason bent on rationalizing life and forcing it to submit to the inevitable, to
morality; life bent on vitalizing reason and forcing it to serve as a support
for its own vital desires’.51 J. Mora explicitly crystallized this idea of
Unamuno when he says,
when experience and common sense join forces with rea-
son, the conclusion is inescapable: human death is a cer-
tainty, and immortality at best an illusion. The denial of
immortality or impossibility of proving it is, therefore, the
virtual equivalent of the affirmation of death. But as
Unamuno says the “yes” lives on the “no”. Or more accu-
rately man’s life swings between the “yes” and the “no”.
This oscillation of judgment does not however, lead us to
a sceptical suspension of all judgment; but rather leads us
to permanent restlessness. It is another manifestation of
the perpetual struggle of opposites which touches off the
cosmic “civil war” in the midst of which all things live.52
By this rendering, it is true that Unamuno seeks to exalt the virtues
of “war” and permanent struggle, given his insistence that there is no pos-
sible solution to the conflict that characterize human existence. In other
words, Unamuno believes that the motif of human existence is “a perma-
nent struggle”. Buttressing this point, Mary Giles argues that in Unamuno’s
philosophical scheme, a human being is human “insofar as he is conscious
of himself as being doomed to physical death and yet, in the anxiety of this
awareness, struggling not to die”.53 This is better explained by J. Mora
when he argues,
There is no reconciliation and peace in Unamuno’s truly
dynamic universe, whether it concludes only the minds of
men or also that of God. Here war plays the part of the
Heraclitean “father of all things”. But although Heraclitus
admitted the existence of a certain cosmic rhythm __ the
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rhythmic alternation according to which the Universe travels
an upward and Down- way - Unamuno dissociates exist-
ence from any thing that might for so much as an instant
diminish its unbending “furring”. What we term “peace” is
found only in war. Thus unity and identity are both present
in Unamuno’s universe. But they exist as much as any
thing does, within the framework of an unending battle.
They struggle to hold their ground and they push forward
__ through unsuccessful __ toward ultimate domination.54
It is clear from the foregoing that Unamuno’s philosophical thought
is suggestive of the fact that a genuine human being is one who knows no
peace. Man is simply a bundle of tension, since human existence in all
ramifications must necessarily be dogged by ceaseless tension of contra-
dictions. In this sense, a human person or existence portrays a battle ground
for eternal conflict such that to live as a human being is to live in “agony, in
permanent tension between opposed elements within ourselves and par-
ticularly between, on one hand, reason’s commands and on the other, the
force of those irrational elements within ourselves that are so important for
our lives”.55 Unamuno is thus inclined to extol the virtues of war. He says
war has always been the most effective factor of progress, even more
than commerce. According to him, it is through war that the conqueror
and conquered learn to know each other and in consequence to love each
other56 Unamuno employs this same element of war to describe and inter-
pret human existence. So far, what obviously stands out from our analysis
of Unamuno’s thought is that human existence is devoid of “peace”. Con-
sequently, if human existence is characteristically devoid of “peace”, so to
speak, a negative interpretation of Unamuno’s philosophy as that which
views human existence as tragic and meaningless holds. There is, how-
ever, a dynamic characteristic feature of Unamuno’s existentialist philoso-
phy. It is its dialectical flavour, given its emphasis on opposition, tension
and contradiction. This raises the question   about the value of dialectics in
Unamuno’s existentialism.  Is dialectics in Unamuno’s thought the same as
that found in philosophies like Hegelianism and Marxism? Examining the
dialectical aspect of Unamuno’s existentialist thought would further illumi-
nate his idea of human person and existence.
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DIALECTICS  IN  UNAMUNO’S  THOUGHT
The term “dialectic” which derives from the Greek word dialelik
means “the art of examining the truth or validity of theory or opinion,
especially by question and answer”.57 The lexicographic meaning of dia-
lectic is thus suggestive of the fact that it is a method that places emphasis
on disagreement or conflict, given   that the art or exchange of opposition
(question) and counter-proposition (counter-question) connotes disagree-
ment or contradiction. Broadly perceived as a method, therefore, dialec-
tic functions as an argumentative framework through which disagreement,
conflict or contradiction may be resolved.
In philosophy, the term “dialectic” is significantly traceable to
Socrates. As a logical method of philosophy, it originated from the Socratic
method of cross-examination; that is, cross-examining one’s assertion in
order to draw out inherent contradictions or falsities within his position.
This is clearly demonstrated in Plato’s dialogues, where, for example,
Socrates is reported to have engaged Euthyphro in a discussion about the
meaning of “piety” thus:
Euthyphro replies that the pious is that which is loved
by the gods. But Socrates points out, the gods are quar-
relsome and their quarrels, like human quarrels, concern
objects of love or hatred. Euthyphro consents that this is
the case. Therefore, Socrates reasons at least one thing
exists which certain gods love but other gods hate. Again
Euthyphro consents. Socrates concludes that if Euthyphro’s
definition of piety is true then there must exist at least one
thing, which is both pious and impious, which Euthyphro
admits is absurd.58
This summarizes the Socratic dialectical method, which is also
known as Socratic irony. It is all about leading one to first accept and
confess ignorance and then discover the truth by himself.
Since Socrates, however, the term “dialectic” has assumed a wide
variety of uses in philosophy. Its most technical forms are expressed in the
philosophies of Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx (1818-
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1833). For example, Kant uses the term to describe “the contradictions
and errors in which reason gets entangled when it attempts to operate
beyond the limits of possible experience”.59  An examination of Hegel’s
philosophy shows that his dialectical philosophy is directly a response to
the Kantian view. He construes dialectic simply as a logical pattern of
thought; the overall pattern being thesis, antithesis and synthesis.60 By this,
Hegel implies that thought (the object of analysis) proceeds by contradic-
tion (thesis/antithesis) and is in turn reconciled by a fusion of the contra-
dictory ideas or opposites (synthesis). Marx on his part agrees with Hegel
on the main features or nature of a dialectical approach to the extent that
it is a process by which one element (the thesis) is contradicted by an
opposing element (the antithesis) and both dissolving into a form of syn-
thesis; a reconciliation of the thesis and antithesis. The detail examination
of Kant or Marx’s or Hegel’s dialectical philosophy is not our main con-
cern here. Suffice to note that Marx’s dialectic differ from Hegel’s
ontologically in that Marx’s dialectic represents a materialist interpretation
of reality while Hegel is idealistic and spiritual. In any case, they both
express a common temper or tendency that there is a unity or reconcilia-
tion to the tension of opposing ideal, conflicts or contradictions within a
dynamic dialectical framework.
In contrast, there is a significant variation in Unamuno’s dialectical
thought even though the foregoing understanding of the word also signifi-
cantly permeates his philosophy. This is so because of Unamuno’s loyalty
to opposition, contradiction, tension and conflict. In fact, Unamuno per-
ceives almost everything mainly from the perspective of tension, opposi-
tion and struggle. For example, Unamuno argues that a human person or
existence is concretely a bundle of contradictions. He further says,
Some may espy a fundamental contradiction in every thing
that I am saying now expressing a longing for unending
life, now affirming that this earthly life does not possess
the value that is given to it. Contradiction? To be sure!
The contradiction of my heart that says No! Of course
there is contradiction. Who does not recollect these words
of the Gospel, “Lord I believe, help thou my unbelief?”
Contradiction! Of course! Since we only live in and by
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contradictions, since life is tragedy and the tragedy is per-
petual struggle without victory or the hope of victory life
is contradiction.60
A significant understanding which derives from this turns on the
fact that Unamuno appropriates the term “dialectic” as a descriptive cat-
egory in that dialectic in his lexicon depicts a human theatre of conflictual
opposites or attributes in relation to an oscillating warring coexistence, for
example, between faith and doubt or, simply say, between thesis and an-
tithesis. But unlike the dynamic dialectical worlds of Hegel and Marx,
there is no reconciliation (synthesis) of opposing elements or ideals in
Unamuno’s truly dynamic dialectical nature of man and his existence.
Unamuno rightly underscores this when he says “we have arrived at the
bottom of the abyss at the irreconcilable conflict between reason and vital
feeling. And having arrived here, I have told you that it is necessary to
accept the conflict as such and to live by it”.62
The denial of a synthesis or final harmony thus sets Unamuno’s
dialectical system significantly apart from the conventional dialectical sys-
tems. J Mora poignantly expresses the inherent distinction of Unamuno’s
dialectic when he argues that while conventional dialectical systems at-
tempt to describe and explain the attributes of the cosmos as   an imper-
sonal being, Unamuno’s dialectic is an entirely personal nature, that is, it is
exclusively about human existence and experience. Mora further says,
All the philosophers who have tried to describe reality as
a dialectical process   of some sort --- Nicholas of Cusa
and Giordano Bruno no less than Hegel - have built con-
ceptual systems in which the opposites end in reunifica-
tion in the bosom of some ultimate and all embracing prin-
ciple. The war between particulars finds peace in the ab-
solute generality of the essential One, so that the principle
of identity overcomes in the end, all contradictions… But
in Unamuno’s world animated by the principle of per-
petual civil war and unending strife, there is no place for
any final harmony and still less any identity- which would
be in his opinion, the equivalent of death.63
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From the foregoing, we can summarize two important differences
between Unamuno’s dialectic and traditional dialectical systems. First,
Unamuno’s dialectic is personal rather than impersonal as in the case of
Hegel. Secondly, underlying Unamuno’s dialectical understanding is a prin-
ciple of irreconcilability in contrast to that of   reconciliation or unification
in other forms of dialectic.
Upon this dialectical mindset, it is not surprising that Unamuno
perceives the authentic human person, human existence or life as one char-
acterized by struggles, contradictions and tension. According to Unamuno,
the battle goes on forever; reason and faith, doubt and
belief, thought and   feeling, fact and desire, head and
heart are united by an association in war, the only oppo-
sition in which they can survive since “each lives on the
other” and feeds on the other there being no third party to
rejoice in or benefit from the struggle, no absolute unity or
supreme harmony to lay peace between the antagonists.
The only attainable peace lies in the eye of this powerful
hurricane but the eye subsists only because the hurricane
moves on.64
By the instrumentality of dialectic, Unamuno presents thus a fright-
ening testimony of a human person and existence, such that the human
person who ordinarily looks simple, plain and peaceful is interpreted in his
philosophy as a most complex entity seething with confusion and contra-
diction. It can, therefore, be said that the dialectical method functions in
Unamuno’s philosophy to bring out concretely the tragic nature of a hu-
man person and his existence.
CRITIQUE  OF  UNAMUNO’S  EXISTENTIALIST  THOUGHT
It is glaring from Unamuno’s truly dynamic world that nothing can
be taken for certain since he argues that life without uncertainty is plainly
unbearable and with absolute certainty there can be no room for faith or
hope.65
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This implies that in Unamuno’s world nothing can be taken for
absolute certainty and absolute doubt are both alike forbidden to us. In
fact, Unamuno perceives a tragic sense in human life arising from the cer-
tainty of death and scepticism surrounding man’s immortality. Such a view
or position about human existence smacks of great tepidity, scepticism,
despair and pessimism. It is bad enough not to be sure of oneself. Neither
is it good to be in a permanent struggle or war.
Besides, Unamuno’s underestimation of reason in the scheme of
things is contestable. His philosophy, in this regard, is diametrically op-
posed to a very common and popular affirmation of reason, and that man
should be judged on a high scale of rationality. In this vein, Godwin Sogolo
argues that the conception of man as a rational being connotes a basic
quality which all human beings are thought to share in common.66 This
portrays “reason” as a superior entity and thus the most important aspect
among the (inner) parts of man including emotion, passion, desire and
feeling. In view of this, traditional philosophers have tended to warn against
the danger of being controlled by one’s passions and desires. For ex-
ample, Plato and the Stoics are unanimous and unambiguous on their un-
derestimation of the emotional aspect of man. In his Ethics, Plato de-
scribes the moral man as man whose life is always controlled by reason
and is always keeping his passions in check.67 J. Omoregbe argues that
the Stoics went beyond Plato in their mistrust of the passion and advo-
cated complete suppression or even complete eradication of the pas-
sion.68 Similarly, and as we underscored in the preceding chapter, Hegel's
conception of philosophy is affirmative and rationalist. He argues in sup-
port of a rationalist philosophy which is capable of giving a priori knowl-
edge of the ultimate structure of reality.69 Baruch Spinoza (1632 - 1677)
and Rene Descartes, are also among a motley of rationalist philosophers
who taught that reason was the ultimate source and standard for deter-
mining the truth and certainty of human knowledge.70
As we sum up the critical exposition of Unamuno’s philosophical
thought, it is necessary to raise objections, particularly to the central thesis
upon which his philosophy is based: The concept of immortality. First, it is
necessary to observe that there is a high level of inconsistency in Unamuno’s
thought in respect of immortality. Though he (Unamuno) may see it as part
of contradictions that define the “tragic sense of life”, the impression one
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gets at the beginning of his philosophical voyage is about a philosopher
who has nothing to do with metaphysical disquisitions. His initial emphasis
on what is concrete suggests that he is a man of “it-is-what-I-see, touch
or hear” that matters. What this implies is that the power of Unamuno’s
philosophy is weakened by his clinging to religious rationalizations. As he
consistently argues, “nothing is real that is not eternal”.71 This is essentially
a statement of the absurdity of life without immortality.
Yet, Unamuno’s understanding of immortality, as already under-
scored, is ambiguous and unsatisfactory. Besides, Unamuno thinks that
his notion of immortality strikes every one with equal interest and appre-
ciation. In this context, scholars and philosophers like David Hume, John
Stuart Mill, Kai Nielsen and Clarence Darrow would not take Unamuno
seriously because they all reject the immortality thesis. Based on the diffi-
culty involved in proving it, empirically or scientifically, they regard a belief
in immortality as a mere wishful thinking. Or what Sigmund Freud would
call “a figment of imagination”. For example, Darrow argued that ‘there is
perhaps no more striking example of the widespread belief in immortality.
Perhaps evidence can be found to support a positive conviction that im-
mortality is a delusion’.72
On his part, Kai Nielsen described the belief in immortality as
both incoherent and unreasonable. He further says,
Conceptions of the afterlife are so problematic that it is
unreasonable for a philosophical and scientifically sophis-
ticated person living in the … twentieth century to believe
in life eternal, to believe that we shall survive the rotting or
the burning or the mummification of our present bodies’73
Closely related to this is Unamuno’s emphasis on the existential
Self, to the extent that he argues not only for a search for immortality but
also the need to fight to keep its existence. Francis Wyers regards this
aspect of Unamuno’s thought as “ontological greed”, given the refusal to
let go of the Self even after death. According to Wyers,”why such an
emphasis on the self... the largest part of this ontological greed comes
from Unamuno’s unresolved passion for his own immortality; which he
took quite literally as meaning that he would never experience the cold
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hands of death nor would he be reabsorbed into God but rather that he
would forever suffer and celebrate the knowledge of his own existence”.74
The fear that B.E. Stone expresses in this regard is that a mixture
of ontological greed and the impossibility of being able to imagine the
world without us would lead to a great suspicion of life itself.75 Afterall,
Unamuno says, “if we die utterly, wherefore does everything exist? Where-
fore?”76
Finally, it is important to note that a great of suspicion of life itself
has been given existential import by Unamuno’s mystification of a human
person and his existence. From the exposition of his philosophical thought,
it is clear that Unamuno has a very fearful and dreadful picture of man
which culminates in viewing man as a bundle of unending confusion, ten-
sion and contradiction. J.F Mora says that the only “formal principle”
which permeates Unamuno’s thought may be stated as follows “to be is to
be against one self”77
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